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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee
v.

:
:

•.

COREY EDWARD HARVELL,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20070967-CA

:

Appellant is incarcerated.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from an Order of restitution entered on November 1, 2007 resulting
from a conviction of Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-202 (2003), and Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003), in the Third Judicial
District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith Atherton,
presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (effective February 7, 2008) (previously codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(2002)). See Addendum A (Order for Restitution).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in ordering restitution for brake replacement
and damaged property inside of a stolen vehicle when defendant only pleaded guilty to
attempted theft by receiving stolen property rather than stealing the vehicle.

Standard of Review: "'[Appellate courts] will not disturb a trial court's order of •
restitution unless the trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its
discretion.' Furthermore, c[w]hether a restitution [award] is proper . . . depends solely
upon interpretation of the governing statute, and the trial court's interpretation of a statute
presents a question of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness.'" State v. Miller,
2007 UTApp 332,^)6, 170 P.3d 1141 (internal citations omitted).
Preservation: This issue was preserved at the restitution hearing held October 12,
2007. R. 87.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of the following statutory provisions determinative of the issue on appeal
are located in Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (2003).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state filed an Information on March 6, 2007, charging Mr. Harvell with one
count of Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(2003); Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003); and Theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404. R. 1-3. Mr. Harvell entered a guilty plea to Attempted Burglary,
a third degree felony and Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree
felony. R. 23-36, 37-38; 96.
.- 2 '

Mr. Harvell was sentenced on September 7, 2007 in four separate cases. In the
cases applicable to this appeal, Mr. Harvell was sentenced to serve two concurrent
indeterminate terms of zero to five years in the Utah State prison for his convictions of
attempted burglary and attempted theft by receiving stolen property. R. 69-69A; 92:7.
The sentence was ordered to be served consecutively with the other cases. Mr. Harvell
objected to the proposed restitution amount and requested a restitution hearing. R. 92:8
A restitution hearing was held on October 12, 2007, where Mr. Harvell argued that
he was not legally responsible to pay restitution for brake replacements or property
missing from the stolen vehicle where he had not been convicted of, nor admitted
responsibility for stealing the vehicle. R. 70, 87:3-7. The trial court ordered restitution
in the amount of $763.24. The amount represents restitution for brake repair, $539.24, a
tank of gas, $25, and replacement of aNano IPOD, $199. R. 71-72; 87:16.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Cami Losee left her vehicle parked at the home of her friend's, Hector Carrillo, on
February 7, 2007 while she was vacationing in Italy. R. 87:9; Losee Ltr. Ms. Losee's
vehicle was reported stolen from this location on February 12, 2007. R. 87:9; Losee Ltr.
On February 13, 2007, officers responded to a report of a residential burglary at
the home of Gary Rigby. R. 66:5; PSR 5. Mr. Rigby reported that when he returned
home, he noticed a vehicle in his driveway. PSR 5. As he approached his home, Mr.
Harvell came out claiming to be a friend of Mr. Rigby's son, Joshua. PSR 5. Noticing
1

The facts are taken from the presentence report (PSR), Ms. Losee's restitution request
and other evidence presented at the restitution hearing. R. 66; 87; Victim information
file: Letter from Cami Losee (Losee Ltr).
3

his home's side window opened, Mr. Rigby went inside and found his home "ransacked."
PSR 5-6. Mr. Rigby found many of his belongings missing from his home. PSR 6. Mr.
Rigby was able to provide officers with the license and description of the vehicle Mr.
Harvell was driving. PSR 5.
At an apartment complex, a man found a box of checks with Mr. Rigby's
telephone number on them and called him. PSR 6. Officers went to the apartment
complex to recover the box of checks. PSR 6. Officers found the vehicle matching the
description given by Mr. Rigby in a parking stall at the apartment complex. PSR 6.
Discovering the vehicle had been reported stolen February 12, 2007, officers went to the
apartment with the corresponding number on the parking stall where the vehicle was
parked. R. 87:9; PSR 6. Mr. Harvell was located within the apartment and taken into
custody. PSR 6.
During questioning, Mr. Harvell admitted to being at Mr. Rigby's residence but
denied entering the home. PSR 6. Mr. Harvell also "initially denied driving the stolen
vehicle, but eventually claimed it was Moaned' to him." PSR 6. Officers determined the
vehicle driven by Mr. Harvell had been taken during a residential burglary and belonged
to Cami Losee.2 PSR 6.

2

Mr. Harvell entered a guilty plea to attempted burglary of Mr. Rigby's home and
attempted theft by receiving stolen property, both third degree felonies. R. 23-36; 37-38,
96. The trial court sentenced Mr. Harvell on both counts to an indeterminate term of zero
to five years at the Utah State prison, to run concurrently with each other but
consecutively to the other cases. R. 92:7.
4

Ms. Losee was in New York when her vehicle was recovered so she had Mr.
Carillo and "another friend Zach Jensen . . . pick up [her] car for [her]." Losee Ltr. It
took Ms. Losee a week to return to Salt Lake City from New York. Losee Ltr. When
Ms. Losee inspected her vehicle upon her return she "noticed the alignment was off, [her]
IPOD was broken and [her] IPOD FM transmitter was missing, [her] cd collection was
noticeably smaller, [her] coat was gone, and the gas tank was empty." Losee Ltr. After
about a week, Ms. Losee "noticed a screeching noise by [her] front passenger side tire
every time [she] pushed on [her] brakes." Losee Ltr.;87:10. Ms. Losee was unable to
afford to have her brakes repaired at this time. Losee Ltr.; R. 87:10. She waited to have
her brakes repaired until April by which time "the problem with [her] brakes made it
almost impossible to drive." Losee Ltr.; R. 87:10.
When she took her vehicle in for repair in April, the mechanic told Ms. Losee that
her "brakes, caliper, and rotor on [her] front passenger side" had to be replaced. Losee
Ltr. In addition, she was informed that repairs to the driver's side of the vehicle were
also necessary because "they couldn't repair one side without repairing the other." Losee
Ltr. The state submitted a restitution request to the court on Ms. Losee's behalf for
$993.03 for the brake repairs and for damage or lost property inside her car. R. 92:8;
87:3; Victim Information file. Mr. Harvell objected to the restitution requested by Ms.
Losee and a restitution hearing was held. R. 87; 92:8.
During the restitution hearing, defense counsel argued that "Mr. Harvell is not
legally bound to pay restitution" because he was not charged with stealing Ms. Losee's
vehicle but pleaded guilty to attempted theft by receiving stolen property. R. 87:3-4.
5

Specifically, defense counsel argued that brakes "are a normal wear and tear issues on a
car" and there was no evidence that Mr. Harvell had caused the brakes to wear out during
his possession of the vehicle. R. 87:5, 13. In addition, defense counsel argued that the
restitution requested for the items damaged or missing from inside the vehicle were
inappropriate because the only property Mr. Harvell pled guilty to receiving was the
vehicle. R. 87:5, 13. The state argued that the restitution was proper because Mr.
Harvell "had control of the vehicle from the night it was stolen to the point it was
recovered." R. 87:10. The state asserted the vehicle was reported stolen on February 12,
2007 and recovered February 13, 2007. R. 87:9.
The trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $763.24. The amount
represents restitution for brake repair, $539.24, a tank of gas, $25, and replacement of a
NanoIPOD, $199. R. 71-72; 87:16. Mr. Harvell filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 7576.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it ordered Mr. Harvell to pay restitution for brake
repairs and replacement of a broken IPOD where Mr. Harvell was not convicted of and
did not admit responsibility for stealing the vehicle. Utah law clearly establishes that a
defendant cannot be required to pay restitution for criminal activities for which he did not
admit responsibility, was not convicted, or agreed to pay restitution. No evidence was
presented to establish a sufficient nexus between Mr. Harvell's admitted conduct of
possessing the vehicle and the damage found. Based on the evidence, it cannot be
established that the extent of damage can be attributed to Mr. HarvelPs short possession
6

of the vehicle rather than the continued driving of the vehicle by Ms. Losee until the
vehicle was "almost impossible to drive." Because Mr. Harvell did not admit
responsibility for stealing the vehicle, the order to pay restitution for the brake repair and
broken IPOD violates due process.
ARGUMENT
POINT. BECAUSE MR. HARVELL DID NOT ADMIT RESPONSIBILITY
FOR STEALING THE VEHICLE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ORDERING RESTITUTION FOR BRAKE REPLACEMENT AND
DAMAGED PROPERTY INSIDE THE VEHICLE.
The trial court erred in ordering Mr. Harvell to pay restitution for brake repairs
and replacement of a broken IPOD Nano where he was not convicted of and did not
admit responsibility for stealing Ms. Losee's vehicle. R. 87:16; 96. Mr. Harvell pled
guilty to attempted theft by receiving stolen property in relation to Mr. Losee's stolen
vehicle. R. 23-36, 37-38; 96. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) states:
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of
another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling,
or withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be
stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it.
Id. Under Utah law, an individual is guilty of an attempt "if, acting with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 764-101(1) (2003). In accordance with these statutes, Mr. Harvell admitted responsibility
only to attempting to "receive[ ] . . . property of another knowing that it has been stolen."

7

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1). Therefore, Mr. Harvell could only be ordered to pay for
restitution resulting from his admitted responsibility.
Utah's restitution statute states in part:
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of
the plea agreement.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a) (2003). The statute defines "'[criminal activities,'" as
"any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for which
the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission
of committing the criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(l)(b) (2003).
"Pecuniary damages" are defined as "all special damages, but not general damages,
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses
including earnings and medical expenses." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(c) (2003).
This court has reaffirmed recently that "'a defendant cannot be ordered to pay
restitution for criminal activities for which the defendant did not admit responsibility,
was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution.'" State v. Hight, 2008 UT App
118, p (quoting State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342,1|9, 60 P.3d 582). This is because
"the restitution statue 'requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly
established, much like a guilty plea before the court can order restitution.'" Hight, 2008

8

UT App at 1|3 (quoting State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273,1(5, 987 P.2d 1289 (per
curiam)).
In State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, 40 P.3d 1143, this Court ruled that the
defendant could only be ordered to pay restitution resulting from her admitted conduct
"enumerated in her plea" which was receiving stolen property rather than paying "for all
items stolen in the burglary." Id. at ^[18-19. In Mast, the defendant pleaded guilty to
receiving stolen property for the possession of property she was found with which had
been stolen as a result of a home burglary. IcL at ^[1. Although Mast had not been
convicted of burglary nor admitted responsibility for any of the other items stolen during
the burglary, the trial court ordered her to pay restitution for the total value of property
taken excluding those items recovered. Id. at ^5. This Court determined that the trial
court erred in the restitution order because the defendant "entered a guilty plea only to the
receiving stolen property charge, she cannot be held to answer for all damages resulting
from the burglary." Id. at 1fl8; see also State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937-38 (Utah 1998)
(finding restitution order erroneous for conduct defendant was not convicted of nor
admitted responsibility). This Court vacated the restitution order and remanded the case
for a hearing, "to determine what pecuniary damages resulted from defendant's admitted
conduct". Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at 1|19.
In contrast, in flight, this Court determined that where a defendant has pled guilty
to a broad offense like burglary, it is unnecessary that "his responsibility for any
particular missing item[] 'be firmly established . . . before the court can order restitution
[for them]." Hight, 2008 UT App 118 at ^|4 (citation omitted). Right had argued that
9

although he admitted to committing a burglary, the trial court had erred in ordering him
to pay restitution for items he never admitted to stealing. Id. This court disagreed stating
that "[o]nce Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary, the trial court acted within its broad
discretion, after reviewing the evidence presented at the restitution hearing, in ordering
restitution for any pecuniary damages clearly resulting from the burglary." Id. at *|j5
(citation omitted).
In this case, Mr. Harvell was never charged nor admitted responsibility for the
broader offense of actually stealing Ms. Losee's vehicle. The factual basis on the plea
form given to support the guilty plea was that Mr. Harvell "drove a stolen vehicle [and]
went to a stranger's house [and] stole a carton of cigarettes." R. 25; 96:7. At the plea
hearing, the factual basis he admitted to was that he "retained or disposed of a motor
vehicle . . ., knowing that the vehicle had been stolen."*" R. 96:8. The presentence report
notes that Mr. Harvell only admitted to the vehicle being "'loaned' to him." PSR 6. The
record supports that Mr. Harvell admitted to no more than attempted theft by receiving
the stolen vehicle, and did not admit to stealing the car or items in it.
For Mr. Harvell to be held responsible for damage to the brakes of the vehicle or
the broken IPOD inside the vehicle, a "sufficient nexus" must exist between these

-

damages and Mr. Harvell's admitted criminal conduct. See State v. Watson, 1999 UT
App 273, YII 3-5, 987 P.2d 1289 (per curiam) (determining that a "sufficient nexus" must
exist between a defendant's admitted criminal conduct and damages suffered by the

J

The factual basis supporting his guilty plea in this case was not discussed during the
sentencing hearing. R. 92.
10

victim before restitution can be ordered). Whether there is a sufficient nexus between the
defendant's admitted conduct and the pecuniary damages suffered by the victim requires
the trial court to determine that "liability is clear as a matter of law and [that] commission
of the crime clearly establishes causality of the injury or damages." State v. Robinson,
860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
For example, in Watson, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted obstruction of
justice after allegedly driving two other suspects to and from a crime scene. Watson,
1999 UT App 273 at <p. Watson also admitted to selling the car used in the crime. Id.
The sentencing court ordered Watson to pay restitution to the Victim's Reparation Fund
for money it gave to the victim's family for counseling. Id. In issuing this order, the
sentencing court stated:
[T]he defendant did admit to the responsibility of driving this vehicle. And
in this court's opinion also, [defense counsel], in spite of the fact that you
maintain that some of the facts are disputed, I am just of the opinion that
there are sufficient facts, substantial as they may be, which are reflective of
the defendant's state of mind in this particular case; i.e., hearing the shots,
individuals running toward the vehicle, her admission that she drove the
vehicle away. In this court's opinion [that] is sufficient nexus to hold her
accountable for restitution. .. .
Id. at <|}4. This Court reversed, clarifying that "the statute is more narrow." Id. at
1J5. Specifically, the statute "does not ask the trial court to analyze a defendant's
state of mind, but rather asks it to focus on admissions made to the sentencing
court." IdL Because Watson admitted only to the obstruction of justice charge, and
there was no "firmly established admission of responsibility upon which to order
Watson to pay restitution," a sufficient nexus did not exist. Id. at ^5.
11

Similarly, in State v. Woods, 953 P.2d 834 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), the
Washington Court of Appeals determined that the restitution order requiring defendant to
pay for personal property taken from a truck when it was stolen was improper because
there was no causal relationship between the defendant's admitted offense and the
victim's damages, h i at 836-38. Woods had pled guilty to possessing stolen property, a
motor vehicle, on September 4, 1995. Id. at 835. However, at the restitution hearing a
letter allegedly written by Woods indicated that she had stolen the vehicle on August 17.
Id. The trial court ordered Woods to pay restitution for personal property taken out of the
vehicle when it was stolen in August. Id.
The court determined that even if it could be assumed "that Woods did steal the
vehicle in August, she cannot be required to pay restitution for other uncharged offenses
because she did not expressly agree . . . to pay restitution for crimes for which she was
not convicted." Id. The court's reasoning was based on the lack of a causal relationship
between Woods's admitted conduct and damage suffered by the victim. Id. at 837.
Employing a "but for" factual test to evaluate a causal link, the court stated "it cannot be
said that "but for" Woods's possession of the stolen vehicle in September, the owner
would not have lost the personal property located in the vehicle when it was stolen in
August."4 Id. In addition, "a reasonable person could [not] foresee the loss of personal

4

This Court's utilization of a "modified but for" test in the context of a restitution hearing
has generally been limited to circumstances where crimes of negligence are at issue
because of the difficulty of determining whether damages resulted from the act of
negligence. See State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (applying a
"modified 'but for' test" to determine whether the intervening negligence of the police
broke the chain of causation relieving defendant of liability for restitution). However,
12

property located in a vehicle when it is stolen as a consequence of mere possession of the
stolen vehicle." Id.; see also State v. Tetters, 914 P.2d 784, 785 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)
(concluding defendant's "mere possession of the vehicle is neither sufficiently, nor
necessarily, related to the lost personal property [from inside the vehicle]. [Defendant]
cannot be obligated to pay restitution for those items."); State v. Sellers, 709 P.2d 768,
770 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (determining defendant can only "be sentenced to restitution for
pecuniary damages to the vehicle that resulted from" the time he actually admitted to
possessing the vehicle).
In this case, there was no evidence that showed a "sufficient nexus" between the
defendant's conduct resulting from the short amount of time he admitted to possessing
the vehicle and the brake repairs required on Ms. Losee's vehicle. Nor was any evidence
presented to show that Mr. Harvell's actual time possessing the vehicle bore any
relationship to the damaged property located inside the vehicle. The facts presented at
the restitution hearing were that Ms. Losee left her vehicle parked at the home of her
friend Hector Carrillo on February 7, 2007, while she vacationed in Italy. R. 87:4, 9;
Losee ltr. Mr. Carrillo reported the vehicle stolen on February 12, 2007. R. 87:4, 9. Mr.
Harvell weis taken into custody and questioned about Ms. Losee's stolen vehicle after he
was linked to the vehicle following a burglary committed on February 13, 2007. R. 87:9;
where the crime is one of criminal intent rather than negligence, the modified "but for"
test is not useful because pecuniary damages are easier to trace, or not to trace, to the
crime. See Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at ^5 ("Without making inferences as the trial
court did, it cannot be said that Watson admitted responsibility for the murder nor did she
agree to pay restitution. Watson only admitted and pleaded guilty to the obstruction of
justice charge for which there were no pecuniary damages. Thus there was no firmly
established admission of responsibility upon which to order Watson to pay restitution.").
13

PSR 6. During questioning, Mr. Harvell "initially denied driving the stolen vehicle, but
eventually claimed it was Moaned' to him." R. PSR 6.
Because Ms. Losee was in New York when her vehicle was recovered, her car was
picked up by her friends Hector Carillo and Zach Jensen. Losee Ltr. Ms. Losee was not
able to inspect her car until a week later when she returned to Salt Lake City from New
York. Losee Ltr. Upon inspecting her vehicle, Ms. Losee "noticed the alignment was
off [her] IPOD was broken and [her] IPOD FM transmitter was missing, [her] cd
collection was noticeably smaller, [her] coat was gone, and the gas tank was empty."
Losee Ltr. It took another week before Ms. Losee notices a "screeching noise by [her]
front passenger side tire every time [she] pushed on [her] brakes." Losee Ltr.;87:10.
However, Ms. Losee claims she was unable to afford to have her brakes repaired at this
time so she waited until April when "the problem with [her] brakes made it almost
impossible to drive." Losee Ltr.; R. 87:10. It was when she finally took her vehicle in
for repair in April, that the mechanic told Ms. Losee that her "brakes, caliper, and rotor
on [her] front passenger side" had to be replaced. Losee Ltr. In addition, repairs to the
driver's side of the vehicle were also necessary because "they couldn't repair one side
without repairing the other." Losee Ltr.
Defense counsel argued that "brakes . . .are a normal wear and tear kind of issue
on a car." R. 87:5. It is something that happens as a vehicle is being driven over a period
of time. There is no evidence to indicate that driving a car for at most what equated to a
24- hour span of time can cause the brakes to wear out needing repairs of this type. Ms.
Losee's friends took possession of her vehicle after it was recovered and a week passed
14

before Ms. Losee could inspect her vehicle. When she does inspect her vehicle she does
not notice anything that would indicate that her brakes had been damaged. It wasn't until
another week passes before she claims that she starts hearing a "screeching noise."
Furthermore, based on Ms. Losee's own statements, it is not possible to establish that the
extent of brake repair required can be attributed to Mr. liarvell's short possession of the
vehicle rather than Ms. Losee's continued driving of the vehicle until "it [was] almost
impossible to drive." Losee Ltr.
In addition, a "sufficient nexus" has not been established between the broken
IPOD located inside the vehicle and Mr. HarvelPs admitted conduct of attempted
possession of the vehicle. Again, Mr. Harvell was not convicted of nor admitted
responsibility for stealing the vehicle. "The only item of stolen property [he was]
charged with receiving [was] in fact the car." R. 87:5. "[A] reasonable person could
[not] foresee the [damage to] personal property located in a vehicle when it is stolen as a
consequence of mere possession of the stolen vehicle." Woods, 953 P.2d at 837; see also
Tetters, 914 P.2d at 785 (concluding defendant's "mere possession of the vehicle is
neither sufficiently, nor necessarily, related to the lost personal property [from inside the
vehicle]. [Defendant] cannot be obligated to pay restitution for those items."). Therefore,
a sufficient nexus cannot be established between the defendant's admitted conduct of
attempted theft by receiving a stolen vehicle and the damages suffered by the victim.
Finally, the sentencing court's order of restitution violates procedural due process
because due process requires more than an inference of responsibility. The Utah
Supreme Court has indicated that federal and state due process entitles a defendant "to
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due process protections during sentencing to prevent procedural unfairness." State v.
Gomez, 887 P.2d 853, 854-55 (Utah 1994). In fact, "procedural fairness is equally
mandated at the sentencing phase as at the guilt phase of a trial." State v. San wick, 713
P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). Mr. Harvell has made no admission of
responsibility for stealing Ms. Losee's vehicle. A formal admission of responsibility is
required under principles of due process because '"[fjor the purposes of determining the
basis for restitution, the admission of a defendant is essentially the same as a plea of
guilty . . . . Because such an admission can result in liability for substantial sums of
money, defendant's responsibility for the criminal activities ought to be firmly
established." Watson, 1999 UT App. 273 at ^|5 (citation omitted). Because Mr. Harvell
did not admit responsibility for stealing the vehicle, the order to pay restitution for the
brake repair and broken IPOD violates procedural due process.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Harvell respectfully requests that the ordering imposing restitution for the
brake repair and broken IPOD be reversed.
SUBMITTED this

\g

day of September, 2008.

^

—

DEBRA M. NELSON
Attorney for Appellant
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
LOHRA H. MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Cristina P. Ortega, #9567
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

Third Judicial District

ORIGINAL
Deputy Ctork

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE Of UTAH,

ORDER FOR RESTITUTION

Plaintiff.
Case No.071901648
-vs-'
Judge Judith S. Atherton

COREY EDWARD HARVELL
Defendant.

Based on the State's Motion, and good cause shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant COREY EDWARD
HARVELL, is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $763.24 to Cami Losee for car
repairs, to include brake repair, gasoline, and a broken IPOD NANO. In addition, the
defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,450.00 to Gary Rigby for
property that was not recovered, including jewelry, a flat screen television set and video
games. The total amount of restitution for both victims in the above entitled case is
$3,213.24.
DATED this

^
I

_day of OCPOBER, 2007,
BY THE COURT

L_JM>

p. ui
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (2003)
76-4-102 Attempt—Classification of offenses.
Criminal attempt to commit:
(1) a capital felony is a first degree felony;
(2) a first degree felony is a second degree felony, except that an attempt to commit any of
the following offenses is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of not fewer than three years and which may be for life:
(a) murder, a violation of Subsection 76-5-203 (2)(a), if the victim or another suffers
serious bodily injury in the course of the actor's commission of the offense;
(b) child kidnapping, a violation of Section 76-5-301.1; or
(c) any of the felonies described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses, that are
first degree felonies;
(3) a second degree felony is a third degree felony;
(4) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor;
(5) a class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor;
(6) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor; and
(7) a class C misdemeanor is punishable by a penalty not exceeding one half the penalty for
a class C misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-4-102, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-4-102; 1983, ch. 88, § 10; 1996,
ch. 40, § 3 ; 2002, ch. 57, § 1.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003)
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and
commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other;
and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any
other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims,
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are
to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or
concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under
Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of
1

Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single
term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any,
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (2003)
76-3-201 Definitions —Sentences or combination of sentences allowed -- Civil
penalties—Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages,
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of
the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and
losses including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to
a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or
transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims
Restitution Act.
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal
activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of
them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
1

(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f)to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that
the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the
defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement,
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the
criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims
Restitution Act.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order
the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the
defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state
at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental
transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
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(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear
a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection
(5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single
trip.
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30,
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal
activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to
any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for
costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order
the defendant to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for the cost of
incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the
county correctional facility; and
(ii) (A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under
Section 64-13c-301 if the defendant is a state prisoner housed in a county
correctional facility as a condition of probation under Subsection 77-18-1(8).
(b) (i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are:
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs
established under Section 64-13c-302; and
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(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that exceed the negotiated
reimbursement rate established under Subsection 64-13c-302(2).
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses
incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation
for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213,
including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the court-ordered
restitution under this Subsection (6), the court shall consider the criteria provided
under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv).
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76- 1-304, the
county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of
incarceration under Subsection (6)(a).
(7) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of
three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of
the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or
mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement
identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional
facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the
opposing party at least four days prior to the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the
highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation
officer's report, other reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404,
statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the
defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for
imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines
regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission.
(8) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape of a
object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the defendant
causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the
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information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or found true by a judge
at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in state
This Subsection (8) takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law.

History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1;
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, §
1; 1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch.
13, § 19; 1995, ch. 111, § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1;
1995 (1st S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch. 79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2, 3;
1998, ch. 149, § 1; 1999, ch. 270, § 15; 2001, ch. 209, § 1; 2002, ch. 35, § 4; 2003, ch.
280, § 1 .
ns.
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